

Political Representation and Challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu State, Nigeria: An Empirical Insight from Enugu East Senatorial District

Chibuike E Madubuegwu PhD¹, Emenonye Henry Nkem PhD², Ojiugo Akakuru Chijinwa PhD³

¹Governance and Development Studies Programme, Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, IPSDS, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

²Department of Political Science, Alvan Ikoku Federal University of Education, Owerri, Nigeria

³Department of Civic and Social Studies, Alvan Ikoku Federal University of Education, Owerri, Nigeria

Email address: ¹totlechi@gmail.com, ²henry2fayol@gmail.com, ³ojiugoakakuru@gmail.com

Abstract— Political representation is the bedrock of accountability in legislative governance. Constituency Development in its value, challenges and impact illuminate the imperatives of legislator-constituents relations in stewardship and accountability. However, legislative studies over the years resonate more significantly on Constituency Development Fund, CDF as the dynamics and trend of Constituency Development, CD in democracies of African countries like Nigeria remain dearth in conceptual and empirical discourse. From this gap, this paper therefore examined the effects of political representation on constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District of Enugu State, Nigeria. The methodology of the paper is a Mixed-Method research design which explored secondary sources (textbooks, journal articles, field reports) and questionnaire instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE for data collection. The data collected was content-analyzed in 4-Point Likert Scale statistical mean score of 399 sample size determined by Taro Yamane formula. Again, Role theory was also applied to underscore the import of political representation as a significant function in constituency development. The paper revealed daunting challenges of constituency development in systemic, attitudinal and institutional failure of political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District. From these findings, this paper recommended for synergy among representatives on priority needs, improved casework support services, civil society advocacy among other fundamentals to bolster quality of political representation of impact in constituency development of Enugu East Senatorial District in Enugu State, Nigeria.

Keywords— Constituency, Constituency Development, Constituency Development Fund, Constituency Service, Democracy, Political Representation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern democracy evinced the essence of participatory politics and governance. People as individuals and collectives show partisanship by entrusting popular mandate through elections for accountability. These dispositions in context and value invariably underlined the import of representation in government and governance. Hence, political representation is expedient to convey popular expectations in state decision-making processes for response and impact.

Nigerian democracy has evolved over the past two decades but remain chaotic in governance and public accountability. Observably, Dadawi (2006) opined that democratic institutions such as the legislative assemblies are yet to effectively mainstream its relevance in anxieties and challenges of Nigerians as constituents across the country. In this vein, Nigerians are yet to feel the essence of democracy which the country transited to after sixteen years of military dictatorship. It is tales of scandals at the upper legislative chamber of National Assembly as the core needs and aspirations of the people are ignored without attention.

Subsequently, it was also observed that over the years there is a representational gap between legislative processes and public expectations in Africa most populous country, Nigeria (Dadawi, 2006; Nijzink, Mozaffar, & Azevedo, 2006; Lafenwa, 2009; Fashagba, 2009; Asimiyu & Adebola; 2019; Ezike, 2022, cited in Madubuegwu, 2026). Similarly, Eze and Asogwa (2025) stressed that democracy has failed in Nigeria because the institutions are not working. The citizens are dismayed as political elite appeared not to be interested on public issues and problems. Further insight into dynamics and process of representation in senatorial districts of Enugu State showed reasonable scale of irregularities as Madubuegwu (2026) revealed that systemic and institutional failures occasioned with attitudinal disorientation among the local representatives and constituents have continue to undermine constituency representation in rural electoral wards of Enugu West Senatorial District.

From this background, it therefore becomes pertinent to interrogate correlation between political representation and challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District of Enugu State, Nigeria. The discourse is divided in this introduction, statement of the problem, research

questions, conceptual and empirical analysis, theoretical analysis, hypotheses, methodology, data presentation, analysis and interpretation, conclusion and recommendations.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In 2011, the leadership of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) in collaboration with the State University of New York organized a workshop at Jamaica to interrogate the performance of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in Commonwealth countries. The workshop brought together parliamentarians from the CPA's Asian, Indian and Caribbean Regions as follow-up to the 56th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2010. The 2011 workshop revealed that, though there was great diversity in how constituency funds were administered and allocated however there was an overall consensus on the need for more governance presence in plights of the constituents (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012). In Nigeria, citizens continue to groan in crises of accountable representation and embezzlement of funds meant for constituency development amid wide spreading poverty and crime (Madubuegwu, Abaneme and Nwaneri, 2026; Nwankwo and Iwuala, 2022). However, these scholarly submissions invariably elicit curiosity on what are the challenges/problems of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial district of Enugu State, Nigeria?

Emphatically, contemporary legislative assemblies in democratic systems are valued particularly because they represent the citizens in the national policymaking process (Almond, Bingham, Dalton and Strom, 2011). In credence, Madubuegwu (2026) asserted that the rule-making structure of the political system arguably represents the most democratic organ of state government and governance. Thus, the "*most democratic*" resonates primarily from representation which expresses public interests and expectations in governance. Painfully, the value of representation embellished (Almond, Bingham, Dalton and Strom, 2011; Madubuegwu, 2026) however appeared not to reflect in Nigerian constituencies as Musa (2016) stressed that the idea of constituency project and development are marred in corruption. In same sense, Orji, (2016) posited that constituency project and its implementations are stridently discussed issues of public discourse in Nigeria. The issue of constituency is seen as an avenue of corruption and a tool used regularly by the legislators to blackmail the executive arm of government. In other words, these issues as raised by scholars therefore elicit fundamental concerns on the quality of political representation towards constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District of Enugu State.

The unpleasant situation as seen as deviance to democratic ideals in representation and constituency development may be a function of many factors. Assertively, Olaoye (2014), Gaskia (2016), Olu and Irabor (2020) shared the view that challenges of constituency projects and development emanate from distortion of the Nigerian budget process occasioned with vested interests of the legislators for the increase in the constituency funds for mismanagement. However, the bulk of the projects carried out as constituencies projects do not have

an adequate framework for monitoring and evaluation due to the nature of their operations. In other words, projects and programmes of this nature result in clientelism, thus fuelling inefficiency and graft while its overall impacts on the rural people are minimal. Furthermore, Dagogo (2022) also added that given the nature of the Nigerian state and its associated politics which the political class has showed lack of morality in political leadership, government policy as this will fail like previous others as a result of corruption and the absence of institutional checks on how government resources are deployed to serve the public good. To this extent, a fundamental question emerged on what could be the factors/conditions perhaps responsible for failed political representation towards constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District if established?

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District?
2. How has political representation ameliorated challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District?
3. What are the factors responsible for failed political representation towards challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District?

IV. OBJECTIVES

1. To identify challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District.
2. To find out how political representations has ameliorated challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District.
3. To illuminate the factors responsible for failed political representations towards challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District

V. CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Representative democracy in government of elected state officials acknowledged the imperatives of *delineation, identification and voice* in what is appropriately contextualized as constituencies. For insight, Benjamin (2014) defined constituency as an electoral district/area/section that had been divided for elections from which the legislative members are elected to serve in a parliament. Similarly, Madubuegwu (2010) viewed constituency as an electoral geographical unit which comprises people and towns represented in parliament of a nation or provincial government.

However, the definitions of constituency are not only limited to electoral geography (district/area) represented in parliament but as a social reality that find relevance in governance process and outcomes (Madubuegwu, 2026). In other words, constituency is further defined as a delineated district/area of the electorate and representatives whose mutual interests resonate in mandate and response. In this contextual elucidation, constituency is defined as district and people under representation for development. Constituency is also conceptualized as people who holds mandate, share interests and promote peculiar plights for government response through political representation.

In this way, Ethridge and Handelman (2013) opined that most of us naturally think of legislators as representing the citizens who elected them, most legislators are given the title of “representative”. Arguably, legislatures can make laws and perform other basic legislative functions while acting in ways that have little to do with representation. And, when the legislators purport to act as representatives they may “represent” in a very different ways. Ethridge and Handelman’s view invariably underlined the polemics in conceptualizing representation. In this line of thought, Curtis (1968) conceived representation as inherently ambiguous to have different meanings. Some see the representers as embodying the declared interests of the represented; others view his function as acting on behalf of the constituents in the way he thinks most desirable. In same vein, Johari (2005) posited that “representation” is laced in general and particular connotations. In generic terms, it implied that any corporate group whether church, business concern, trade union, fraternal order or state, that is too large or too dispersed in membership to conduct its deliberation in an assembly of all its members is confronted with the problem of representation if it purports to act in any degree in accord with the opinion of its members.

In exclusive sense, political representation is a process that involves authorisation and, accountability. It is also the act of looking out for another’s interests or the activity of making citizens’ voices, opinions, and perspectives “present” in the public policy making processes (Pitkin, 1997). Similarly, political representation is a process when political actors speak, advocate, and act on behalf of others in the political arena (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, cited in Okpanachi, 2012).

Emphatically, political representation is the process by which persons chosen/selected/elected acted in the interest or on behalf of the community or sections thereof, or the process by which an idea, issue, line of action or programme was portrayed as expectation of the entire community or sections thereof. Representation arguably occurs through elections, selections and appointments into the formal structures and bureaucracies of decision-making, implementation and feedback. It is also seen in mobilizing and aggregating through and within largely voluntary institutions, organizations and associations (Agbaje, 1999).

However, it was argued that the issue of representation has generated deep and recurrent political controversy. For instance, the absolute monarchs of old were expected to rule by seeking the advice of the estate of the realm (the major landed interests, the clergy, and so on) as the English Civil War of the seventeenth century was fought between King and Parliament as a result of attempt to deny representation to key groups and interests. To this extent, debate about the spread of democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries centered largely upon the question of who should be represented. Should representation be restricted to those who have the competence, education and perhaps leisure to act wisely and think seriously about politics (Heywood, 2007).

In the context of this discourse, political representation is a process of relation between representatives and represented on issues and interests of mutual benefits. In illustrative sense,

politicians elected to represent constantly engage with the constituents as stakeholders, partisan groups, social collectives and individuals in exploring legislative capital/resources (bills, motions, oversight and projects) for improved social welfare and development of the constituency.

Subsequently, the theoretical literature on political representation has focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees (Okpanachi, 2012). To this extent, there are two broad views on political representation amid other classifications. In this regard, Ethridge and Handelman (2013) highlighted the delegate and trustee models of representation. The delegate model is where a legislator make decisions largely on the basis of the expressed wishes of the constituents and acted as their spokesperson. For instance, if clear majority of a legislators’ district favors (or opposes) a particular proposal, the legislator’s decision is made. On the other hand, the trustee model is where, a legislator may take decisions as his or her own judgment dictates with little regard for the opinions of the constituents. In this vein, a legislator acts as a trustee of constituents and constituency.

Also, Almond, et al. (2011) remarked that politicians who intends to be good agents need to have similar preferences to the citizens they represent. Again, they need the appropriate skills to do their jobs. For instance, as far as skills are concerned, education and experience are the most important factors. In other words, political and governmental leadership-particularly in modern and technologically advanced societies-requires knowledge and skills that are hard to acquire except through education and training.

Basic to the interests/preferences of the representatives and constituents is constituency development. Constituency Development, CD is ostensibly a concept that has not gained much attention in its conception, dynamics, impact and challenges in the literature of legislative studies. However, Constituency Development Fund, CDF appeared more enormously in scholarly submissions and documentary reports.

In this discourse, Constituency Development, CD is broadly defined under the following:

- i. As an articulated idea known as *Development Blueprint for Constituents*, DBC designed by a legislator or legislators in consultations for services and projects towards improving socio-political and economic development of the constituency. In this vein, Constituency Development represents well-conceived plan of a parliamentarian or parliamentarians that outlines measures for legislative governance participation, social welfare services and infrastructural projects in an electoral district under representation.
- ii. As services and projects initiated from the desk/office of the legislator/legislators and implemented by appropriate executive offices/agencies to improve social, political and economic lives of the constituents. In this regard, Constituency Development is a reference to services delivered and projects executed in deference to plights and expectations of the constituents for transformation and well-being.

Constituency Development is also a multifaceted process visibly seen in articulated legislative bill by the legislator/legislators in credence to the concerns of the constituency, legislative motions moved for prompt action of

the executive to mitigate a displeasing situations among constituents, legislator-constituency relations in town hall meetings for legislative governance participation, oversights to strengthen relations with the executive in the interests of the constituents, infrastructural projects for socio-economic imperatives which are initiated for improved social welfare and development. Essentially, the blueprint of Constituency Development, CD is visibly seen in legislative agenda translated into bills, motions, services and projects for improved social conditions of the constituency.

Emphatically, Constituency Development, CD in tangible and measurable indicators is also seen in constituency services and constituency projects. In this vein, Rodrigues, et al. (2024) observed that studies on constituency service span over four decades. As Fenno (1978) pointed out that many of the questions raised remain unresolved. The question revolves around what constituency and constituency service represent in meaning and interpretations? From this indication, it is observed that many legislators perceived a constituency as a nest of circles that includes a geographic constituency with boundaries established by law; a re-election constituency composed of people who elected the legislator; a primary constituency comprising his/her strongest supporters, and a personal constituency composed of private networks.

Arguably, these perceptions in electoral significance of constituency dismissed the representative essence of constituency. Furthermore, Rodrigues, et al. (2024) also observed that most researches in legislative studies underplay heterogeneity by focusing mainly on the geographic and electoral constituencies which lent polemics in the interpretation of constituency service. However, Eulau and Karpis (1977) defined constituency service as a service responsiveness. More implicitly, constituency service is defined as a nonpartisan and non-programmatic effort to advance and defend the particularistic interests of the constituents (Cain, et al., 1984).

In further sense, constituency service is defined as legislator's services in relations with the constituents on matters of personal and collective interests. Constituency service is service provided to strengthen relations and build confidence between the legislators and constituents. Hence, constituency services represent services for the constituents as individuals (for personal gain) and as groups (community stakeholders, partisan and non-partisan associations for particular expectations). For instance, lawmakers enabling constituents to find employment, win contracts, give bursary awards, get nominated for executive offices/tasks are services for individual aspirations/needs while legislator's cash donation to community development projects, sponsorship of party meetings, free medic care for vulnerable women and elderly and hosting of periodic town hall meetings. To add, constituency services come in its forms and essence which are largely influenced and determined by access to the lawmaker/lawmakers, perception and orientation of the lawmaker/lawmakers to constituents' demands, willingness to assist, partisan interest, constituents' perception towards their representatives, legislator contacts and access to legislative and

executive capital to assist, etc. Beside constituency service, the concept of constituency project illuminates.

Bashiru (2017) defined constituency projects as budgeted project/projects that enabled legislators to accelerate socio-economic development of constituencies where they represent. Constituency project is peculiar to legislators and, regarded as one of the benchmarks for measurement of effective representation of the constituency. In more illustrative sense, Udefuna et al. (2013) posited that constituency projects are projects like roads, schools, electricity, water for the benefits of constituencies. Similarly, Odua (2017) viewed constituency project as one of the positive credentials of Nigerian democratic system which enables the legislators to respond to the expectations of the people at the grass roots.

In explicit sense, constituency projects are constituency needs in infrastructure and other fundamentals identified by the lawmakers and financed by the executive for social welfare and development of the constituents. Constituency projects are state funded constituency services/projects that strengthen legislature-executive relations in ameliorating plights and meeting with expectations of the constituents through the implementation of development projects for improved social conditions. At the core of constituency service and constituency projects is Constituency Development Fund. Hence, state designated fund used to finance constituency projects is alternatively known as Constituency Development Fund (CDF).

Constituency Development Fund, CDF is therefore defined as a government allocation mechanism/platform that channels a specific portion of the national budget to the constituencies of Members of Parliament (MPs) to finance development projects such as the construction of school facilities, health clinics and water supply systems for the constituents (International Budget Partnership 2010; Keefer and Khemani 2009a; Policy Forum 2009 cited in Tsubura, 2013). In addition, Baskin (2010) documents that there were 15 developing countries where Constituency Development Fund, CDFs are implemented. A Constituency Development Fund, CDF is a distinctive mechanism where the Members of Parliament (MPs) are given the privilege and authority to determine projects in general interests of their constituents. To this extent, Constituency Development Fund, CDFs are not merely a means of transferring public funds from central to local governments, but a strategic tool for the redistributive game by Members of Parliament MPs in electoral politics. Hence, Members of Parliament, MPs use the funds to respond to the development needs of their constituents, cultivate personal votes and enhance their chances of re-election (Cain, et al, 1987; Cox and McCubbins, 1986).

Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2012) further embellished principles and guidelines in the implementation of Constituency Development Fund, CDF as seen below:

1. First Principle is Responsiveness: Constituency Development Funds, CDFs are distributive policy tool designed to meet the development needs of citizens. The success of Constituency Development Funds, CDFs is contingent upon an inclusive process of consultation and co-operation among

constituents, MPs, and technocratic experts. In this vein, Constituency Development Funds, CDF as initiatives are expected to respond to local developmental needs. Constituency Development Funds, CDFs to realize these expectations required channels of input for local citizens and civil society at all steps in decision-making (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012).

II. Second Principle is Transparency: Transparency in the implementation of Constituency Development Funds CDFs remains a fundamental cornerstone of an open government that promotes citizen engagement. Transparency also refer to an open process in CDF project selection and implementation. As it is expected that MPs, CDF committees and/or implementers shall open decision-making processes to the public. Thus, MPs and CDF committees and/or implementers are expected to consult with the constituents on local development problems and all possible solutions. All deliberative decisions made by MPs, CDF committees and/or implementers and other bodies shall be open to the public. Again, the flows of all CDF funds shall be transparent and traceable to specific decision-making processes. All financial information regarding the use of CDF funds on projects shall be publicly available and documented according to standard and auditable accounting principles while documentation of CDF funding shall be made publicly available in a timely manner (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012).

III. Third Principle is Administration and Management: Constituency Development Funds shall be administered and managed in an efficient, effective and transparent manner. In this regard, MPs and committees and/or implementers shall facilitate the process by mobilizing citizen participation, streamlining implementing mechanisms and proactively complying with them. Such actions are expected to ensure that Constituency Development Fund, CDF administration and management will be performed in a timely fashion and remain faithful to the intents of its protocol and expectations of the continents (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012). Also, it is advocated that:

- a. Constituency Development Funds shall be allocated to individual constituencies in a fair and equitable manner, regardless of MPs' partisanship, gender, religion, race or ethnicity.
- b. Constituency Development Funds shall be released in a timely manner and CDF projects shall be completed timely.
- c. Constituency Development Funds shall be channeled to a separate account of a public agency. Access to the money will be restricted to officially designated managers. The funds will be handled following the highest standards of public financial oversight. The organization of CDF management will be distinctly outlined. Each administering body at corresponding levels shall function with unambiguous legitimate authority, explicit responsibility and substantive commitments. The structure of authority will be clearly defined and stated to the public to ensure that citizens are knowledgeable about the decision-making process of CDF management (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012).

IV. Accountability and Oversight: Basically, accountability and oversight play very essential roles in promoting project quality, improving decision-making, and preventing corruption and abuse of Constituency Development Funds. Proper oversight of CDF financing ensures fiscal probity and promotes accountability to the public among MPs and CDF committees and/or implementers. Within government regulations, MPs, CDF committees and implementers shall be held accountable for their respective roles, conduct and decisions in the process of CDF implementation. Appropriate entities with adequate monitoring and oversight capability shall be assigned responsibility for overseeing CDF implementation. Any findings and/or results of investigations shall be released to the public in a timely manner (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012).

V. Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects are essential tasks to help ensure effective delivery of constituency projects. To realize this, MPs, and other stakeholders, shall engage proactively in facilitating this process. Monitoring shall be performed throughout a CDF project to ensure that it is progressing towards its publicly stated goal. If a monitoring entity determines that a project is deviating from its stated goal; under government regulations then it is expected to make recommendations about adjusting implementation. Evaluation shall be conducted upon completion of projects by appropriate government agencies. Evaluations shall be made publicly available to ensure that CDF committees and/or implementers are aware of the effectiveness of the previous CDF projects (Report of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2012).

In an instructive sense, the constituency development is funded to provide critical services and projects for transformation and well-being of communities and people under political representation. Hence, constituency development index is used to assess representative performance of the lawmaker/lawmakers in constituencies.

It is also pertinent to examine empirical studies in line with established research questions to identify gaps. In the first research question, *what are the challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District?*

Dagogo (2022) in a study titled, "Legislators' Constituency Projects and Challenges of Implementation interrogated legislators' constituency projects and the challenges of implementation in Nigeria. The acknowledged constituency project as a noble design to bring dividends of democracy to the grassroots in Nigeria but revealed challenges which emanates from the execution of this programme as a failure of Nigerian state. These challenges revolves around corruption which result to poor implementation and poor quality delivery. The paper recommended for more effective institutional efforts to mitigate corruption in the execution of constituency projects.

Subsequently, it was also revealed that there are a whole lot of abandoned constituency projects across Nigeria. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the policy environment is replete with a litany of abandoned projects. This unpleasant reality stems from inconsistency in project initiation and the inherent corruption enabled politicians to abandon projects when money has been paid. For example, in 2010, 436 constituency projects

were tracked in 16 States across the 6 geopolitical zones of Nigeria. However, it was reported that only 145 of these projects were completed, 221 were abandoned and 77 were ongoing at the time (Albert, 2010).

The Report of Constituency Projects Tracking Group (2019) also document that it is on record that from 2015 to 2019 the number of cash recovered from awarded constituency projects across the country, Nigeria amounted to N78.09 million recoveries in cash, N660.52 million in assets while N1.83 billion has been saved for the government. It also pointed out that about two hundred contractors went back to sites as a result of tracking activities of this agency. The point to be made clear from the above is that these are monies and assets released as Zonal Intervention Programmes that were abandoned by the implementing agencies, ministries and departments in alliance with the legislators who nominated them.

In a different perspective, Dagogo (2022) and Albert (2010) stressed that the core mandate of the legislator is to carry out oversight functions over the executive. This role is mediated at two levels. The relationship revolves in the relationship between the legislature and executive and, the relationship between parliament and constituents. To this extent, the sustained benefit of constituency projects is that it empowers the legislature to carry out development projects directly without being held down by bureaucratic red tape in the executive. In political actuality, this process constitutes an impediment. Also, the evidence from Nigeria and elsewhere points to the fact that this has even made the legislators more dependent on the executive. This is because the CDFs compromises the independence required by legislatures to oversee the executive effectively. With the executive controlling large amounts of money designated for individual MPs, it is easy for the administrative organ to pressure and influence.

However, the studies examined enunciated the import and issues underlying the implementation of Constituency Development Fund in Nigeria but failed to specifically reveal challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District, Nigeria.

In the second research question, *how has political representation ameliorated challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District?*

In 2009, a CDF was adopted in Tanzania as a result of an endeavor by the Speaker of Parliament to bolster the authority and responsibilities of Parliament. Since then, 10 billion Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) (approximately US\$7 million) has been allocated to the CDCF annually, which amounted to approximately 0.2% of the national budget in FY2010/11. On average, each constituency received Tsh 41.8 million (approximately US\$29,000). However, the outcome has not measured up with the allocation made for effective development in spite of the enormous funds (Ally, 2010).

In comparative index, the design of the CDCF is similar to the CDF in Kenya because the funds are automatically allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement to obtain the approval of the executive. As is the case in Kenya, projects funded by the CDCF are selected by a committee established in each constituency, chaired by the respective MPs.

This model/practice in Kenya is considered pertinent to strengthen the autonomy of individual MPs from the executive by decentralising the allocation of public funds for their constituency service. Also, in both India and Tanzania, CDFs were adopted by the leaders of long-serving ruling parties. When CDFs were introduced, the Congress in India did not have majority seats in Parliament, while 87% of MPs were CCM in Tanzania. Given the dominance of CCM (ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, CCM: 'Party of Revolution') in Parliament. One can also speculate that the CDCF might have been a CCM strategy to maintain its large majority in Parliament by bestowing favours on incumbent MPs. In fact, in advance of the past elections of 2000 and 2005, several laws in favour of CCM candidates were passed to maintain party dominance in Parliament (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2010 and Makulilo, 2011).

Also in Ghana, the first CDF was initiated as part of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a formula-based system of financial transfers from the central government to the District Assemblies, which was established in 1994. A portion for Members of Parliament was established within the DACF in 1996 after MPs from both the governing and opposition parties demanded in Parliament that they would not consent to the allocation method of the DACF unless they were allocated a share of the funds. In this scenario, the executive was blackmailed into agreeing that portion of the DACF would be allocated to MPs. Since then, a designated 5% of the national revenue was set aside to the DACF, of which 5% was allocated to 230 MPs who can decide on the projects to be funded in their constituencies. In 2006, 52.3 million Ghana Cedis (GHC) (approximately US\$57 million) was allocated to the MPs' share of the DACF which implied that each MP was allocated GHC227,000 (approximately US\$247,000) (International Monetary Fund 2009). The percentage of the allocation to the DACF increased to 7.5% of the national revenue in 2008, and Parliament requested a further increase to 10% in 2013 (Graphic Online Reports, 2013; Modern Ghana 2007, Banful 2009). Expectedly, District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) continue to experience increase to scale raising expectations.

However, the empirical studies examined failed to show how political representation ameliorated challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District, Nigeria.

The third research question asked what are the factors responsible for failed political representation in response to challenges of constituency development in Enugu East District, Nigeria.

Nwankwo and Iwuala (2022) in a study, *The Effects of Corruption in the Successful Implementation of Constituency Projects in Nigeria: A Critical Review* showed weighty and loftiness of the letter and spirit that entrenched constituency projects in the scheme of governance. Unpleasant situation where the Nigerian lawmakers argues that as representatives of the people, legislators are constantly in touch with their constituents and are therefore in best position to appreciate their peculiar priority needs which they can then articulate in the budget annually. This study revealed that funds appropriated for the execution of projects across the country has been used as a

tool for self-enrichment by the law makers. Also, it explicated how some members of the National and state Assemblies corner the funds of the constituency projects into their personal pockets without actually executing any projects they scramble to put in the budget every fiscal year. Hence, serving as the conduit pipe through which lawmakers embezzled money. The study holds that these projects serve largely as bait for corruption in the budgeting process. From these findings, it recommended among others for transparency in budgeting, administration and management of constituency funds.

Subsequently, Udefuna, et al. (2013) carried out a study on Legislative Constituency Project in Nigeria: Implication for National Development. The study employed qualitative method to interrogate how legislative constituency projects have fostered national development in Nigeria. Findings from the study argued that constituency project is an idle move towards the devolution of resources and development. The study further stressed that the misconception about management of the constituency project holds no water any more since it is now a definite fact that Nigerian parliamentarians only make recommendations during executive budgeting process of contacts and engagement. Afterwards, relevant MDAs oversee the award of contracts and their implementation as against the general misconception that the National Assembly members have been feeding fat on the Constituency project fund. The study in its recommendation stressed the need for more enlightenment of Nigerians on how constituency projects works from the budgeting to the implementation can be tracked.

Also, Chesan, et al. (2016) investigated the Role of Constituency Development Fund in Achieving Equitable Distribution of Resources to Constituencies in Kenya: A Case Study of Baringo Central Constituency. The study was guided by three theoretical frameworks in participatory theory, public sector capital budgeting decision theory and public sector fiscal decentralization theory. The study discovered that the Constituency Development Funds has contributed significantly in the distribution of resources to educational projects. Again, findings point out that CDF has also contributed significantly to distribution of resources to the health projects. Amid these achievements, the study also discovered delay in the release of the fund as a major challenge. It was recommended that the process of administration of the fund should be strengthened for timely releases.

However, the gap illuminate in the factors responsible for failed political representation in response to challenges of constituency development in Enugu East District, Nigeria.

These gaps will be filled through the findings elicited from questionnaire survey instrument.

VI. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Political representation and constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District is a discourse in role theoretical analysis. Role theory developed in psychology, sociological and social psychological analysis. Early scholars like Jacob Moreno in his work, *Who Shall Survive?* (1934) conceptualized therapeutic role-playing and psychodrama to accentuate *role essence* and *role impact*. Also, George Herbert Mead in his remarkable work, *Symbolic Interactionism* (1934) further

watershed the *role-making* in the dynamics of constant interfacing. Ralph Linton in his work, *The Study of Man* (1936) laid the foundation status of *role distinction* in anthropology. Subsequently, scholars like Robert Merton contextualize *role-definition* within the context of social structure in his work, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949) while Talcott Parsons redefined role in context of structure and function in his work, *The Social System* (1951) cited in Madubuegwu, et al. (2020).

Finding the relevance of role theory in political analysis, Ambe-Uva (2013) opined that Role Theory assumes that the social context best captures individual role in political processes and phenomena. In the introductory Essay of an *Application of Role Theory to Legislative Behaviour*, it was argued that “no legislature or other institution could be seen by the analyst if the human actors did not exhibit behaviour in conformity to at least some nominal extent, with the norms of behaviour constituting their roles” (Wahlke, 1962). Isaak (1985) writes that “one attractive feature of role theory is its attempt to place political activity in a social context; that is, a conceptual framework is provided that views the individual as someone who depends upon and reacts to the behaviour of others”. In explicit sense, role theory is emphatic in functional differentiation, context of functional display and functional impact. The following are the broad assumption of role theory in political analysis:

- i. **Role Expectation:** Political actors find themselves in various positions, with certain behaviour patterns associated with them. It implied that roles comes with expectations which shapes orientation and display. To add, Ambe-Uva (2013) opined that the literature on role theory in political science has identified two kinds of expectations. The first category of expectation is those that “outsiders” have. A society has certain notions about what an office holder should and should not do. The second category is the office holder/role player awareness of expectations from designation of his office.
- ii. **Role Context:** Role is defined, situated and displayed within the context of social structure. Every role has its structure from where it is performed, assessed and improved.
- iii. **Role Conflict:** Diverse interpretation of *role expectations* and, issues/events influencing *role context* conventionally breed deviance and conflicts among role players as Isaak (1985) pointed out that role emanates from complex social situations. Any conceptual scheme or model that is developed from the approach will have to simplify the situation, in emphasizing a particular set of relationships and de-emphasizing others. As it is illustrated that legislature is “colleague” to his fellow legislators, “representative” to his constituents, “friend” (or enemy) to lobbyists, “follower” to his party leaders... Whatever role is taken, simultaneously, what emerges is a very intricate structure of relations in which one role is implicated in several other roles (Eulau, 1963).
- iv. **Role Deficiency:** As indicated, role misinterpretation may bring conflicts but it also undermines efficiency and outcome. In the same vein, Ambe-Uva (2013) illustrated that in some circumstances, actors’ political roles may

conflict with their social or economic roles. For example, a member of House of Representative may be faced by dilemma to satisfy his constituency, and still confronted by enormous expectations. And, once such scenario occur then role deficiency showed.

- v. Role in Coordination and Impact: Ambe-Uva (2013) highlight what is described as *role network* to underscore the import of role relationship among role players. However, role theory like other theories is vulnerable to limitations. Thus, the complexity of most role networks in modern time and its underlying limitations and effects was not comprehensively captured by recent scholarship in role theory. Then, question resonates from the inextricable interface between role and behavior which predominate and influence performance? Also in role theory, there are non-role variables that may influence behavior of the role-holder which were not explained (Carl, 2017 and Ambe-Uva, 2013). In spite of these limitations, role analysis still serve as logical framework of this discourse.

In application, political representation and constituency development are roles that come with expectations between the lawmakers and constituents. In Enugu East Senatorial District of Nigeria, it is expected that lawmakers should provide functional representation that addresses needs and aspirations of constituency development. It is a bi-expectation existing between the legislators and constituents.

Again, the role context is Enugu East Senatorial District where enormous expectations exist in social services and infrastructure that needs to be mitigated through legislative capital of the representatives at local, state and national level of legislating. However, these expectations are intense and competitive which breeds conflict and deficiencies if not effectively managed by the representatives of Enugu East Senatorial District.

In Enugu East Senatorial District, for roles to make impact, reasonable scale of understanding between the representatives and constituents is required obvious in role coordination or role-networking for impact. This discourse therefore sought to know the extent of understanding existing between the representatives and constituents of Enugu East Senatorial District.

VII. HYPOTHESES

1. Abduction for ransom, poor quality projects, poverty and hunger, inadequate social services in water and electric energy and absence of town hall meetings are challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District.
2. Periodic empowerment scheme in sharing of sewing machines and tricycles, scholarship and bursary award, casework services in assisting to secure jobs, cash donations to partisan support groups, laws/motions to combat hunger and crime are responses of political representation to mitigate challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District.
3. Rigged parliamentary elections, docility of the constituents, corruption, lack of institutional checks and absence of awareness on tracking of constituency funds are factors responsible for failed political representations towards

challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District.

VIII. METHODOLOGY

The research design is mixed-method with emphasis on qualitative and quantitative instruments of data collection and analysis. The research design was applied to ensure adequacy of data collection and analysis for valid conclusion and generalization.

The area of study is Enugu East Senatorial District in Enugu State, Nigeria. Enugu is one of the thirty-six states and located in the Eastern region of Nigerian Federation. Enugu in historic, political and geo-graphical imperatives serve as the regional capital of Eastern of Nigeria Federation. Enugu is divided into three senatorial districts (Enugu North, Enugu East and Enugu West) for territorial, state and local representations.

Enugu East Senatorial District is an area in a terrain of hills, escarpments and valley occasioned with rivers. It is also located with Enugu Capital or Enugu Metropolis but its landmass extents to the outskirts of state capital. Enugu East Senatorial District is made up of six local government areas which are Enugu North, Enugu East and Enugu South (urbanized); Nkanu West and Isi-Uzo (semi-urbanized) while Nkanu East is rural.

The Constituency Profile of Enugu East Senatorial District is presented under the following table.

TABLE I. Profile of Constituency Representation in Enugu East Senatorial District of Enugu State, Nigeria.

Federal House of Representative Constituencies in Name	State House of Assembly Constituencies in Name	Local Wards in Statistics
Enugu East/Isi Uzo Constituency	Enugu East I	3
	Enugu East II	9
	Isi Uzo	11
Enugu North/Enugu South Constituency	Enugu North	13
	Enugu South I	4
	Enugu South II	9
Nkanu East/Nkanu West	Nkanu East	14
	Nkanu West	14
Total	Eight	77

Source: Adapted from Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015).

The population of Enugu East Senatorial District is 1,674, 600 distributed in the table below.

TABLE II. Population of Enugu East Senatorial District

Local Government Area	Population
Enugu East	397, 700
Enugu North	347, 500
Enugu South	284, 200
Nkanu-East	220, 400
Nkanu- West	211, 500
Isi-Uzo	213, 300
Total	1, 674, 600

Source: Adapted from Federal Republic of Nigeria (2022)

The population of Enugu East Senatorial District comprised of indigenes and residents who are predominantly Igbos of Christian inclination and few other persons from other tribes and Islamic faith.

The sampling technique is Taro Yamane formula used to determine the statistical sample size from the target population of 1, 674, 600.

The Taro Yamane formula state as follows:

$n = \frac{N}{1 + (Ne^2)}$

Where:

n = Sample size

N = Population, e = Level of significance (margin of error)

= Constant utility

Here (5%)

$$e^2 = (0.05)^2 = 0.0025$$

The formula was applied as stated below :

$$N = \frac{1,674,600}{1 + 1,674,600(0.0025)}$$

$$N = 1,674,601 \times 0.0025 = 4,186,502$$

$$1 + 4,186,502 = 4,186,503$$

$$n = \frac{1,674,600}{4,186,503} = 399.9$$

In reference to the mixed-method research design of this study, data in textbooks, journal articles, field reports, government publications, editorials that dissected issues underlying political representation and constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District were explored. In addition, a validated questionnaire instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE was designed and used to elicit responses from 399 sample size respondent population. The respondent sample size are 399 indigenes and residents (constituents) were reached and assessed performance of political representations of serving 1 Senator, 3 federal house of representative members, 8 state house of assembly members and 77 ward councilors in Enugu East Senatorial District through a validated questionnaire instruments.

As regarding technique of analysis, content-analytical method was used to interpret and analyze secondary data and respondents responses elicited. In addition, the 4- Point Likert Scale was used to present and lend interpretation to the statistics of the responses elicited. Primary Data collected from the questionnaire instrument was analyzed using the 4-Point Likert rating scale in a cluster of five questions items under three hypothetical assumptions. Numerical values will be assigned according to the strength and weakness of the opinion of the respondents. In the following order are:

Real Limit Values

Real Limit

- Strongly Agreed, SA = (4 Points) 3.50 – 4.00
- Strongly Disagreed SD = (3 Points) 2.50 – 3.49
- Agreed A = (2 Points) 1.50 – 2.49
- Disagreed D = (1 Point) 1.00 – 1.49.

An interval scale of 0.5 will be added to bring the mean to 3.5 which represent the decision rule. Hence, any response receiving a mean score rating of 3.5 will be regarded as positive response while less than 3.5 will be regarded as negative response. Also, a cumulative grand mean will be employed to determine the strength or weakness of the general view of the respondents.

IX. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The hypothetical assumptions were tested from the responses elicited from the questionnaire instrument, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE. After sharing the validated 399 questionnaires among the respondent sample size, only 390 were successfully retrieved which represents 97.5 percent.

In this regard, the following are responses in figures presented below:

Questionnaire Items	X Remark
1. Abduction for ransom.	3.6 Positive
2. Poor quality projects.	3.7 Positive
3. Poverty and hunger.	3.3 Negative
4. Inadequate social services in water and electric energy.	3.4 Negative
5. Town hall meetings.	3.7 Positive
Grand Mean	3.5

Fig. 1. First Hypothesis on Constituency Challenges in Enugu East Senatorial District

Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.

The index of Figure 1 indicated that Enugu East Senatorial District under legislative representations (from territorial to ward) is currently experiencing challenges of constituency development in insecurity (abduction for ransom), poor execution of life-changing projects in road infrastructure and rarely organized town hall meetings for conservation between the representatives and constituents which recorded mean rating score above 3.5 to show respondents' discontent.

Despite these challenges, the elicited views of the respondents affirmed that poverty and hunger and, inadequate social services in water and electric energy cannot be attributed to failed political representations in Enugu East Senatorial District. Opinion further indicated that the development gaps are largely the failure of executive organs of government at the levels of local and state administrations. These contrary views in response to questionnaire items reflected in mean rating score below 3.5.

In an interpretive sense, the constituents of Enugu East Senatorial District are currently demanding for legislative accountability from representatives at national, state and rural levels of legislating in security measures and life-changing constituency projects for well-being and development. Again, the constituents are also desirous for engaging relations and conservations with these representatives on issues of constituency anxieties, concerns and expectations.

Conclusively, the hypothetical assumption on the challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District is established. The grand mean value of 3.5 underscores the factuality of these daunting challenges in respondents' views established.

The index of Figure 2 showed that political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District are yet to effectively address challenges of constituency development. Laws and motions have not created safe and conducive environment for development as scholarship and bursary awards are not given

to encourage enrollment in schools (at levels of primary, secondary and tertiary education) for the less privileged children and adults. To add, there is abysmal failure in casework support services for the constituents to secure jobs in public service institutions. These elicited views reflected in mean rating score below 3.5.

Questionnaire Items	X	Remark
6.Periodic empowerment scheme in sharing of sewing machines and tricycles.	3.5	Positive
7.Scholarship and bursary awards.	3.4	Negative
8.Casework Services in assisting to secure jobs in public services.	3.4	Negative
9.Cash donations to partisan support groups.	3.5	Positive
10.Laws/motions to combat hunger and crime.	3.4	Negative
Grand mean	3.4	

Fig. 2. Second Hypothesis on Responses of Political Representation towards Challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu East Senatorial District
Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.

Despite these challenges, the elicited views of the respondents affirmed in mean rating score of 3.5 showed that periodic empowerment scheme in sharing of sewing machines and tricycles is a political representation of accountability which has to a reasonable extent addressed challenges of constituency development in self-reliance and productivity. In addition, respondents' views in mean rating score of 3.5 also indicated that cash donation to partisan support groups in constituency is invariably a financial assistance to the constituents.

In interpretive sense, political representations in Enugu East Senatorial District have not responded effectively through legislative capital to fundamentals of social well-being in, access to education and employment opportunities. Again, the constituents are also desirous to feel the impact of laws and motions that will create safe and developing environment in food supply to alleviate hunger.

Conclusively, the hypothetical assumption on the responses of political representation towards challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu East Senatorial District was not established. The grand mean value below 3.5 underscores the factuality of failed political representation towards challenges of Constituency Development in respondents' views established.

Questionnaire Items	X	Remark
11. Rigged parliamentary elections.	3.7	Positive
12.Docility of the constituents.	3.2	Negative
13. Corruption.	3.7	Positive
14.Lack of institutional checks.	3.5	Positive
15.Absence of a awareness on tracking of constituency funds.	3.7	Positive
Grand mean	3.5	

Fig. 3. Third Hypothesis on Factors Responsible for Failed Political Representation Toward Challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu East Senatorial District

Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.

Interestingly, the index of Figure 3 indicated that there are factors responsible for failed political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District. Parliamentary elections conducted in the Senatorial District were attested to be fraudulent and produced unpopular persons to serve as representatives. This unfortunate scenario breed attitudinal and institutional corruptions occasioned with failed checks from appropriate enforcement agencies (ICPC, EFCC) over the implementation of constituency projects and, limited awareness among the constituents to track constituency development funds and projects. These elicited responses in mean rating score of 3.5 and above 3.5.

On the contrary, the respondents did not see docility among the constituents as a factor responsible for failed political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District as established in mean rating score of 3.2. It further implied that constituents in Enugu East Senatorial District are not docile on issues of constituency development as a legislative accountability from senator, federal house of representative members, state house of assembly members and councilors.

In interpretive sense, the failure of political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District resonates from systemic, attitudinal and institutional irregularities. The representatives of the Senatorial District have failed in obligations to provide more impacting service and projects to ameliorate problems and, the majority of the constituents are ignorant of measures to know more about money budgeted for constituency projects and process of its implementation. This unpleasant situation also seen across constituencies in Nigeria sustained representational gap between the representatives and constituents on issues and expectations of constituency development.

Conclusively, the hypothetical assumption on the factors responsible for failed political representations toward challenges of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District is established. The grand mean value in 3.5 accentuate the functionality of these factors responsible for failed political representation in respondents' views established.

X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Political representation in Enugu East Senatorial District is fraught with systemic, attitudinal and institutional challenges to respond more effectively to enormous plights and expectations of constituency development as established in respondents' views (questionnaire instruments).

From the findings established, the following recommendations are instructive to bolster political representation in deference to enormous expectations of constituency development in Enugu East Senatorial District:

1. Synergy among the representatives and the constituents of Enugu East Senatorial District to identify challenges of constituency development and explore legislative capital to mitigate them.
2. Security and casework services should be the legislative agenda of Enugu East Senatorial District lawmakers to assist and support less privileged constituents in individual and collective endeavor.

3. The civil society organizations and other advocacy groups should not relent in educating the constituents with requisite knowledge and measures to adopt to make demand for legislative accountability from representatives of Enugu East Senatorial District.
4. Constituency Development is a mutual benefiting venture for electoral value of the representatives and well-being of the constituents. In other words, there is need for engaging, inclusive and participatory avenue where the representatives and constituents play important roles in constituency development.
5. Finally, the enormous corruption in the administration of constituency funds and implementation of constituency projects can only be addressed by the proactiveness of the anti-graft agencies like EFCC, ICPC to investigate and prosecute persons found culpable.

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APPENDIX

Mean Rating on Constituency Challenges in Enugu East Senatorial

S/N	Questionnaire Items	Responses						
		SA	A	SD	D	$\sum FX$	X	DECISION
1	Abduction for ransom.	256 1,024		134 402		1,426	3.6	Positive
2	Poor quality projects.	293 1,172		97 291		1,463	3.7	Positive
3	Poverty and hunger.	145 580		245 735		1,315	3.3	Negative
4	Inadequate social services in water and electric energy.	192 768		198 594		1,362	3.4	Negative
5	Town hall meetings.	301 1,204		89 267		1,471	3.7	Positive
Grand mean $\sum \frac{x}{n} = \frac{3.6+3.7+3.3+3.4+3.7}{5}$		17.7/5 = 3.5						

Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.

Mean Rating on Responses of Political Representation towards Challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu East Senatorial District

S/N	Questionnaire Items	Responses						
		SA	A	SD	D	$\sum FX$	X	DECISION
6	Periodic empowerment scheme in sharing of sewing machines and tricycles.	207 828		183 549		1,377	3.5	Positive
7	Scholarship and bursary awards.	160 640		230 690		1,330	3.4	Negative
8	Casework Services in assisting to secure jobs in public services.	199 796		191 573		1,342	3.4	Negative
9	Cash award to support groups.	189 756		203 609		1,365	3.5	Positive
10	Laws/motions to combat hunger and crime.	181 724		209 627		1,351	3.4	Negative
Grand mean $\sum \frac{x}{n} = \frac{3.5+3.4+3.4+3.5+3.4}{5}$		17.2/5 = 3.4						

Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.

Mean Rating on Factors Responsible for Failed Political Representation toward Challenges of Constituency Development in Enugu East Senatorial District

S/N	Questionnaire Items	Responses						
		SA	A	SD	D	$\sum FX$	X	DECISION
11	Rigged parliamentary elections.	281 1,124		109 327		1,451	3.7	Positive
12	Docility of the constituents.	89 356		301 903		1,259	3.2	Negative
13	Corruption	298 1,192		92 276		1,468	3.7	Positive
14	Lack of institutional checks.	187 748		203 609		1,357	3.5	Positive
15	Absence of a awareness on tracking of constituency funds.	281 1,124		109 327		1,451	3.7	Positive
Grand mean $\sum \frac{x}{n} = \frac{3.7+3.2+3.7+3.5+3.7}{5}$		17.8/5 = 3.5						

Source: Statistical data culled from Questionnaire Instrument captioned, Political Representation and Constituency Development in Enugu East, PRCDE (2026), calculated in Likert Mean scale value and presented in Figure.